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Merger and Collusion in Contests
by
STEFFEN HUCK,K AI A. KONRAD, AND WIELAND MÜLLER∗
Competition in some product markets takes the form of a contest. If some ﬁrms
cooperate in such markets, they must decide how to allocate effort on each of
their products and whether to reduce the number of their products in the com-
petition. We show how this decision depends on the convexity properties of the
contestsuccessfunction,andwe characterizeconditionsunderwhichcooperation
is proﬁtable. (JEL: D 44, L 11, L 13)
1 Introduction
Competition in product markets is sometimes well described by a contest, particu-
larly if competition via prices is not feasible. In such markets sellers may contest
with each other and spend resources in order to attract customers to buy from them
andnot from another seller. The type of effortcan differ from one market to another.
It may take the form of visits, gifts, persuasive talking, or invitations to confer-
ences in fancy holiday resorts. The last, for example, is popular in the market for
prescription drugs in countries with health care systems. As prescription drugs are
covered by health insurance, regardless of whether consumers or physicians make
the consumption choice, price competition is more or less ruled out. Pharmaceutical
companies’ marketing efforts for over-the-counter drugs or prescription drugs are
estimated to be in the range between 20 and 40 percent of sales revenues (see, e.g.,
BREYER ANDZWEIFEL [1999, p. 366], SCHERER [2000, p. 1303], and BERNDT et
al. [1995]). In other markets sales effort consists of various types of advertising as
in the markets for cigarettes or beverages, or, as in the retail insurance business,
of visiting and persuasive talking to customers. Again, this becomes particularly
pronounced if price competition is not feasible, which used to be the case in many
European insurance markets prior to deregulation on the EU level in 1992. Prior
to deregulation, the regulators protected insurance companies from “ruinous com-
petition” by regulating insurance premiums and by restrictions on agents’ sales
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commissions and on marketing expenses (see, e.g., REES ANDKESSNER [1999]).
Other important contest examples are ﬁrms competing for a monopoly as in R&D
contests (see, e.g., BAGWELL ANDSTAIGER [1997]), contests for quasimonopoly
due to network externalities (BESEN ANDFARRELL [1994]), or ﬁrms seeking spe-
cialpolitical favors inrent-seeking contests, andthe results inthis paper could apply
qualitatively to these contests as well.
SCHMALENSEE [1976] observed and characterized promotional competition in
markets with few sellers and differentiated products: “[P]rice competition is rela-
tively rare in such markets. Prices generally change infrequently, and sellers com-
pete, if at all, mainly through product variation and promotional expenditures. It
is thus of some interest to attempt to model rigorously markets in which the only
competition is of this sort” (p. 493). With promotional competition, ﬁrms spend
effort to attain some payoff or “prize”: for instance, a large share in a market in
which price exceeds marginal cost. Firms win a customer with some probability (or
a share in the total market on the aggregate level) as a function of the various efforts
of all competing ﬁrms. These contests are all-pay auctions. Efforts are made (and
sunk) before the customer makes its decision.
In this paper we consider cooperation among a subgroup of m ﬁrms in a market
with n (> m) ﬁrms that is characterized by this type of competition and address
two questions. First, we ask what are the factors determining whether the group of
cooperating ﬁrms will reduce their number of products. For instance, ﬁrms often
have established brands for close substitutes, and have to decide whether to keep
all brands after a merger or to abandon some of them. If they keep all brands, we
shall call this collusion. If they reduce the number of brands, we shall call this a
merger. Note that these notions do not refer to the institutional form of cooperation,
but simply to whether the cooperating ﬁrms decide to reduce the number of their
brands. Cigarette markets are an example for what we call “collusion” here: the
big ﬁrms have multiple brands and, when advertising one of their brands, take
into account that they partially cannibalize on their own other brands (NGUYEN
[1987]). The U.S. soft-drink industry, in contrast, is an example in which ﬁrms
seem to concentrate on single brand names. We ask how the type of cooperation is
determined by speciﬁc characteristics of the contest.
Second,weaskwhethercooperationincontestsisproﬁtable.Thequestionofprof-
itabilityofmergerorcollusionofasubgroupofﬁrmsinanindustryhasreceivedcon-
siderable attention forCournot orBertrandcompetition intheabsence ofsaleseffort
(see, e.g., SALANT,S WITZER, ANDREYNOLDS [1983], DENECKERE ANDDAVID-
SON [1985], GAUDET ANDSALANT[1991], and FARRELL ANDSHAPIRO[1990] for
analyses).Theseanalysesshowedthatcooperationcanharmcooperatorsandbeneﬁt
their competitors.1
1 The incentives for divisionalization, which is in some sense the inverse of
a merger, have been analysed in BAYE,C ROCKER, AND JU [1996] for the case of
Cournot competition. A complementary analysis of divisionalization for contests is in
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BARROS ANDSØRGARD[2000] also consider promotional competition, allowing
for some form of collusive price-setting behavior. They consider only merger and
study the relationship between advertising and price collusion. Their results are
sensitive to the particular contest success function they use for determining market
shares. On a more general level, our results relate to the discussion of cooperative
rent-seeking. DIJKSTRA [1999] considers several structures of cooperation in con-
tests, allowing for matching grants, delegation, and choices of different roles for
different members of a cooperating group of rent-seekers. In our paper the group
of contestants collapses into one single decision-maker that maximizes the group’s
total payoff, which rules out more sophisticated contractual arrangements such as
matching grants or strategic delegation.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we describe our basic model of promo-
tional competition: sales contests. In Section 3 we consider the determinants for
whether ﬁrms merge or collude. In Section 4 we consider proﬁtability of merger
and collusion, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Contests
Consider a market with n identical ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm offers one product (or brand).
Suppose that these ﬁrms make efforts in a contest for some prize of size B.Af e w
examples for this type of competition have been discussed in the introduction. Each
ﬁrm i chooses contest effort xi ∈[ 0,∞). These efforts are irreversibly spent by
contestants before they know who wins the contest. Contest efforts determine ﬁrms’





In the context of promotional competition, this parametric form (1) has been used to
determineﬁrms’marketsharesasafunctionofadvertisingbySCHMALENSEE [1992,




[1982] and, in the context of R&D contests, by FULLERTON ANDMCAFEE[1999].
The coefﬁcient a in (1) is called discriminatory power. It is a measure of how
much the contest outcome can be inﬂuenced by contest effort, and how much is
left to chance. For instance, if a → 0, each contestant ends up with the same qi,
irrespective of contest efforts. If, instead, a →∞ , (1) approaches a contest success
function in which the contestant who makes the highest effort wins the prize. We
limit the discriminatory power to a ∈[ 0,n/(n − 1)) in order to have well-behaved
issues, but the divisionalization analysis does not tell whether ﬁrms prefer to merge or
to collude, or how proﬁtable these choices are.Steffen Huck, Kai A. Konrad, and Wieland Müller 566 JITE 158
optimization problems with equilibria in pure strategies and ﬁrst-order conditions
characterizing these equilibria.2 (We discuss the case a →∞brieﬂy in footnote 3.)
Firms are risk-neutral. Their (expected) payoffs are
πi = qiB − xi. (2)
Firmi wins B withprobability qi andspendscontesteffortequalto xi.Theﬁrst-order
condition for ﬁrms maximizing their payoffs and symmetry can be used to calculate













Firms contest for contracts with individual customers, whose decisions can be seen
as a random function of sales effort. With many identical customers, however,
qi can also be interpreted as ﬁrm i’s market share, and we will make use of this
interpretation in what follows.
3 Cooperation of a Subgroup of Firms
Consider a contest of n ﬁrms, each ﬁrm promoting one product (or brand) in a sales
contest. Suppose m ﬁrms merge or collude. Let N be the set of all ﬁrms, and M be
the set of ﬁrms that cooperate in one of these ways. Denote by U = N\M the set of
ﬁrms that do not participate in the cooperation. We consider the following contest
game. Each noncooperating ﬁrm chooses effort xk in order to maximize its payoff,
and the set of cooperating ﬁrms chooses a vector (x1,...,xm) of sales efforts in the m
products in order to maximize their joint proﬁts. The total proﬁt of the cooperating

















k∈U(xk)a B − xu. (6)
For the equilibrium we obtain
Proposition 1: Thecooperatingﬁrmsallocatethesumoftheireffortsequallyamong
all products i ∈ M if a < 1, and concentrate all effort on one product if a > 1.I f
a = 1, the allocation of efforts between different products i ∈ M is indeterminate.
2 For the equilibrium (in mixed strategies) for the case of ∞ > a > n /( n − 1)
see BAYE,K OVENOCK, AND DE VRIES [1994]. For a →∞see BAYE,K OVENOCK,
AND DE VRIES [1996].Merger and Collusion in Contests (2002) 567
Proof: Suppose the M-group anticipates the vector of given equilibrium effort
choices (xu1,..., xun−m) by noncooperating ﬁrms. Whatever this vector is, by (5), if
a = 1,t h e nπM solely depends on the sum of efforts the cooperating ﬁrms exert,
i.e., on

i∈M xi. Accordingly, it does not matter how they allocate their efforts. If
a > 1, the cooperating ﬁrms maximize the probability of winning by making use of
the increasing returns to scale, i.e., by concentrating all efforts on one product. At
the same time the cooperating ﬁrms’ total costs only depend on the sum of efforts.
Hence, πM is maximized if indeed all effort is concentrated on one product. Finally,
if a < 1 (i.e., with decreasing returns to scale), it is straightforward to see that the
total proﬁt of cooperating ﬁrms πM is maximized if the total group effort is spread
evenly among all product lines. Q.E.D.








conditions: Firms merge if f is convex, and ﬁrms collude if f is concave.
An important assumption underlying Proposition 1 is simultaneity: neither the
cooperatingﬁrms’choiceoftotalequilibrium effortnortheallocationofthisamount
between different products becomes known to the noncooperating ﬁrms before they
choose their own efforts. Cooperating ﬁrms may sometimes choose to close down
a number of products and keep only h ≤ m products when they decide to cooperate,
andthismaybeobservedbythenoncooperatingﬁrmsbeforeallﬁrmsentertheactual
contest game of choosing efforts. Proposition 1 states that in this case cooperating
ﬁrms would choose to spread effort equally among the remaining h product lines
if a < 1, and to concentrate all effort on one product if a > 1. Intuitively, if a < 1,
there is an advantage in having a large number of products, because the total
impact of a given budget xM =

j∈M x j is larger for a larger number h of products.
However, the equilibrium reaction of the noncooperative ﬁrms must also be taken
into consideration. If the noncooperating ﬁrms spend more effort in the equilibrium
if h is large, the cooperating ﬁrms’ optimal choice of h becomes ambiguous. On
the other hand, if a > 1, the choice of h becomes irrelevant. In that case all ﬁrms
anticipate that the cooperating ﬁrms will concentrate all effort on one product.
Hence, the choice of h does not matter, as any choice h ≥ 1 yields the same payoffs.
4 Proﬁtability
Considernowwhethercooperationofasubgroupofﬁrmsisproﬁtableforthisgroup.
From Proposition 1 we know that cooperation essentially leads to a situation in
which the set of noncooperating ﬁrms contest with one single ﬁrm with one product
if a > 1.I fa < 1, Proposition 1 tells us that the noncooperating ﬁrms contest withSteffen Huck, Kai A. Konrad, and Wieland Müller 568 JITE 158
one ﬁrm that has m products and spends the same effort on each product. Hence,
we can consider proﬁtability of cooperation for the two cases separately.
4.1 High Discriminatory Power (a > 1)
Suppose m < n ﬁrmscooperate in a contest with a > 1. ByProposition 1 they spend
efforton only one of their products. Without cooperation the set M ofﬁrmsreceived
a payoff equal to mπ∗(n). With cooperation their payoff equals
π
∗(n − m + 1) =
B
n − m + 1
−
aB(n − m)
(n − m + 1)2.
Now let g(n,m,a) be the function that measures the gain (or loss) of m ﬁrms that
merge in an industry composed of n ﬁrms, i.e., g(n,m,a) is given by
g(n,m,a) = π




n − m + 1
−
aB(n − m)









and has the following properties:
(i) For all n ≥ 2 it holds that g(n,1,a) = 0. (If one ﬁrm is joined by no other in
a merger, the proﬁt does not change.)
(ii) For all n ≥ 2 and for all a > 0 it holds that g(n,n,a) = (B/n) · a(n − 1)>0.
(Merger to monopoly is always proﬁtable.)








n3(2a + n − 2an + an
2 − n
2)  0
if and only if
a 
n(n − 1)





for n ≥ 2

.









n − m + 1 − a(n − m − 2)
(n − m + 1)4 > 0,
i.e., g(n,m,a) is strictly convex (and also continuous) with regard to m.
With the help of properties (i)–(iv) we can prove the following
Proposition 2: Let n/(n − 1)>a ≥ 1.
(A) If there are three ﬁrms, then merger of two ﬁrms is proﬁtable.
(B) For any number n of ﬁrms, there is a critical discriminatory power a0(n) such






(n − 1)2 + 1

and n ≥ 4.
Then the following two statements hold true: If merger by a speciﬁed number of
ﬁrms is not proﬁtable for the merging ﬁrms, merger by a smaller number of ﬁrms is
also not proﬁtable. If merger by a speciﬁed number of ﬁrms is proﬁtable for them,











then for any number n ≥ 4 of ﬁrms, merger of any number m = 2,3,...,n of ﬁrms
is proﬁtable.




(n − m)(m − 1)
n(n − m + 1)
B < 0.
The proof of part (C) follows the lines of proof of result D in SALANT,S WITZER,
ANDREYNOLDS[1983]: properties (i) and (iii) imply that g(n,m,a)becomes nega-
tive for small m > 1 if a < n(n − 1)/[(n − 1)2 + 1]. Note that
n(n − 1)
(n − 1)2 + 1
=
(n − 1)2
(n − 1)2 + 1
n
n − 1
with the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side being smaller than 1. According to prop-
erty (iv), g(n,m,a) is continuous and strictly convex in m. Thus, because of prop-
erty (ii), there is a unique y∗ < n such that g(n, y∗,a) = 0, and the result follows.
Finally, for the proof of (D), it is straightforward to see that, in this case, proper-
ties (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) imply that g(n,m,a)>0 for all m = 2,3,...,n. Q.E.D.
Intuitively, cooperationthat makesﬁrmsin M concentratetheireffortononeoftheir
products has two effects. First, it increases the total proﬁt of the industry, because
the total contest effort is reduced with a reduction in the number of contestants.
Second, the share of industry proﬁt that goes to the cooperating group of ﬁrms is
reduced. Proposition 2 shows that the proﬁtability of cooperation depends on the
discriminatory power of the contest and on whether the ﬁrms that take part in the
merger constitute a large share in the total number of ﬁrms. If the discriminatory
power is not too large, cooperation of many ﬁrms can be proﬁtable whereas cooper-
ation of few ﬁrms is not. However, if the discriminatory power is sufﬁciently high,
merger – of any number of ﬁrms – is always proﬁtable.3
3 We restricted attention to a < n/(n − 1) in order to concentrate on pure-strategy
equilibria. However, for a →∞ , and with m < n, the contest is a symmetric fully
discriminatory all-pay auction. It is known (see, e.g., HILLMAN AND RILEY [1989]
and BAYE,K OVENOCK, AND DE VRIES [1996]) that all ﬁrms’ payoffs are zero in the
(mixed-strategy) equilibrium for this type of contest, whether ﬁrms cooperate or not.Steffen Huck, Kai A. Konrad, and Wieland Müller 570 JITE 158
4.2 Low Discriminatory Power (a < 1)
Considernextthecaseinwhichcooperationdoesnotreducethenumberofproducts.
The colluding ﬁrms take into account that an increase in contest effort on, say,
the product of ﬁrm i ∈ M reduces the market shares of all other ﬁrms’ products,
including the shares of the ﬁrms in M. This latter effect will be internalized, leading
toalessaggressiveeffortchoiceofcolluding ﬁrms.This, inturn, changesthecontest
behaviorofallotherﬁrms.UsingProposition 1fora < 1,weobtain(reduced)payoff





k∈U(xk)a B − mxµ (7)





j∈U(x j)a B − xu. (8)
Maximization of (7) yields a ﬁrst-order condition for the choice of xµ,w h i c h ,a f t e r




a + (n − m)(xu)
a]
2, (9)
and maximization of (8) with respect to xu for u ∈ U yields a ﬁrst-order condition
for the choice of noncooperating ﬁrms, which, after using symmetry, becomes
a(xu)
a−1[(n − m − 1)(xu)
a + m(xµ)




This system of two equations determines xµ and xu, but is not analytically solvable,
except for some special cases. This makes it impossible to compare the equilibrium
proﬁts mπ∗(n) of the M-group in the fully noncooperative equilibrium with the
equilibrium proﬁts with collusion. However, we can solve three partial problems.
First, we ﬁnd
Proposition 3: At effort values of the fully noncooperative equilibrium, noncoop-
erating ﬁrms react to a marginal joint reduction in effort among colluding ﬁrms by
an increase in their contest effort.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
If the ﬁrmsin the colluding group M uniformly choose an effort level that is slightly
lower than the effort level x∗(n) in the fully noncooperative equilibrium, the ﬁrms
outside this group anticipate this, and they choose higher efforts. As this holds for
any size of the group M, Proposition 3 states that the efforts of the ﬁrms in M
and the efforts of the ﬁrms that do not cooperate are strategic substitutes locally at
the fully noncooperative equilibrium. This result contributes to the discussion on
whether advertising redistributes market shares or increases the total market. The
empiricalstudy by ROBERTS ANDSAMUELSON[1988],forinstance, ﬁnds “negative
conjecturalvariations”:Aﬁrmi expectsthatother ﬁrmswillreducetheiradvertising
if i increases its advertising effort on some of its brands. This negative slope of
reaction functions is considered as counterintuitive if advertising is an activity thatMerger and Collusion in Contests (2002) 571
reallocates market shares in a market of given size. The negative slope is, however,
in line with advertising being a voluntary contribution to a collective good that
increases the size of the whole market. Proposition 3 shows that the empirical
ﬁnding by ROBERTS ANDSAMUELSON [1988] is also compatible with advertising
as an activity that reallocates shares in a market of given size: reaction functions in
contests can have negative slope in some range of the strategy space, and the slope
is negative at the noncooperative equilibrium.4
Proposition 4: A marginal joint reduction (increase) in effort among colluding
ﬁrms that is observed by noncooperating ﬁrms before they choose their effort
increases their proﬁt if the discriminatory power of the contest is smaller (bigger)
than (n(m − 1))/(m(n − 2)).
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
Proposition 4 says that, if the colluding ﬁrms can choose effort as a Stackelberg
leader, they can always do better than in the fully noncooperative Nash equilibrium.
Todo this they choose effortthat is smaller (larger)than the Nash-equilibrium effort
if a is sufﬁciently small (large). Intuitively, the direct effect of cost savings from
reduced effort within the colluding group outweighs the direct effect of reduced
market share and the indirect effect of noncooperating ﬁrms’ changes in effort if the
discriminatory power of the contest is sufﬁciently small.
Letusreturntosimultaneouseffortchoicesandconsiderthecomparisonofproﬁts
in the fully noncooperative equilibrium and in the equilibrium with m colluding
ﬁrms. As pointed out above, for the general case with a, n,a n dm arbitrary, the
problem of comparing these payoffs is not tractable, because it is not possible to
calculate closed-form solutions for the efforts in the equilibrium with collusion
from (9) and (10). However, closed-form solutions for efforts can be obtained for
the case m = n − 1. Note that this also includes the interesting case with n = 3
and m = 2. From (9) and (10) we obtain xµ = a(n − 1)aB/[(n − 1)a + (n − 1)]2 and
xu = (n − 1)xµ. Inserting in (7) and comparing this proﬁt with (n − 1)π∗(n) yields
πM − (n − 1)π
∗ =
(n − 1)B
(n − 1) + (n − 1)a −
a(n − 1)a(n − 1)B









which depicts the proﬁt gain from collusion for B = 1), and we obtain from (11)
limn→∞[πM − (n − 1)π∗]=aB.
We summarize this result as
Proposition 5: Collusion of n − 1 ﬁrms is always proﬁtable for a ∈ (0,1].
4 Given that strategic complementarity or substitutability of effort choices is not
a global property in contests, it is not surprising that the empirical results on strate-
gic substitutability by ROBERTS AND SAMUELSON [1988] are controversial (see, e.g.,
SELDON,B ANERJEE, AND BOYD [1993]).Steffen Huck, Kai A. Konrad, and Wieland Müller 572 JITE 158
Figure 1
Proﬁt Gain of m = n − 1 Colluding Firms
5 Discussion and Conclusions
If we compare cooperation of a subgroup of ﬁrms in markets with promotional
contests with cooperation in Bertrand or Cournot markets, we ﬁrst observe that the
cooperating group’s choice of their number of products becomes important. Firms
may or may not want to keep the number of brands they had prior to cooperation.
We found that cooperating ﬁrms may reduce the number of products on which
they spend sales effort. Furthermore, we found that the crucial determinants for
this decision are the convexity properties of the contest success function. With high
discriminatory power(increasing returnsto scale),ﬁrmswill concentratetheireffort
on one product (or brand); with low discriminatory power (decreasing returns), they
will keep the whole range of products (or brands) and will spread out their efforts
equally.
The results on proﬁtability of cooperation with or without a reduction of products
are less straightforward than in Bertrand or Cournot competition. As is known from
DENECKERE ANDDAVIDSON [1985], strategic complementarity as in the Bertrand
competition caseissufﬁcientforproﬁtability. Incontests, strategic complementarity
or substitutability of contest efforts of different contestants is not a global property
and changes across the strategy space. This fact makes it impossible to rely on
the straightforward reasoning used, for instance, in the Bertrand competition case.
Nevertheless, we found that cooperation can be proﬁtable in contests. Generally,
cooperation tends to be proﬁtable if the number of cooperating ﬁrms is sufﬁciently
large or if the total number of ﬁrms is sufﬁciently small. Also, cooperation tends to
be proﬁtable if the discriminatory power in the contest is high.Merger and Collusion in Contests (2002) 573
It would be nice to be able to draw some welfare conclusions on merger and
collusion in contests. In the context considered here, cooperation that reduces the
number ofproducts (merger)reducestotal contest effort.However, whether areduc-
tion in total contest effort reduces or increases welfare depends on the nature of the
effort. For instance, if this effort is sales effort, the welfare effect of the reduction
depends on how the effort affects consumers. Consumers may appreciate effort for
its intrinsic value or for its information value. Also, effort may change customers’
rents from consuming the product. Finally, effort can be pure waste or can have
characteristics of a transfer. These ambiguities make a welfare analysis difﬁcult.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the effect of a symmetric marginal reduction in effort choices by the con-
testants in M on their equilibrium proﬁts. The ﬁrst-order condition (10) determines
howcontestants inU willreacttoananticipatedreductionin xµ.Deﬁnethisfunction
as
xu = ξ(xµ) ≡ argmax
xk≥0
	




It is clear that such xu exists by standard ﬁxed-point arguments. ξ is implicitly de-
termined by (10). We call ξ the symmetric reaction function of the noncooperating
ﬁrms for effort choices of the cooperating ﬁrms. At the fully noncooperative equi-









(n − am)(n − 1) + am
. (A2)
The slope of the reaction function ξ at the fully noncooperative Nash equilibrium
as in (A2) is strictly negative for all n ≥ 3 and m ≤ n − 1. To see this, note that
a ≤ n/(n − 1). This conﬁrms Proposition 3. Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
As ∂πk/∂xk = 0 and ∂πi/∂xk =− (n/(n − 1)) for i  = k at the fully noncooperative
Nashequilibrium witheffortsasin(3),theproﬁtincreaseofeachﬁrminthemerging
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This condition resembles condition (5) in GAUDET ANDSALANT[1991], who con-











which conﬁrms Proposition 4. Q.E.D.
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